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I.  
Notre heritage n’est précédé d’aucun testament. 
—René Char 
 
Is it possible to conceive anew the relation between art history and philosophy, 
disciplines with indelibly German birthrights, without abandoning the ruins of its 
aftermath?  After philosophy, after art history: this is more than a temporality, it is 
an orientation, a movement towards and after that which has been forfeited.  And 
yet, only in the aftermath of each, between art history and philosophy, are we 
granted our inheritance.  What has been given is a tradition that, while irreparable, 
induces a recollection of what remains.  What remains, what returns, is neither art 
history nor philosophy.  
To read and study this relation between generations and disciplines we 
must confront two unfinished projects that sought to step beyond the demarcations 
of philosophy and art history, two projects by forebears who rejected the names 
‘philosopher’ and ‘art historian’: Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin.1  What 
comes next is unimaginable if we do not return to this pair of German-Jewish 
émigrés, who succeeded and failed in crossing borders both physical and 
conceptual.  These proper names have long been bound to one another, and each 
offers art history and philosophy a lesson that has been difficult to receive.  The 
difficulty arises not only from the incompleteness of their respective projects, but 
also from a certain reluctance to read Benjamin alongside Arendt, Arendt alongside 
Benjamin.2
This alongside or neben is at once a preposition of location (beside, next to) 
and one of exception (against, aside from).  If we attend to this nebenbei, this 
simultaneity of Arendt and Benjamin, then perhaps we can understand how and 
why both reconceive historiography and aesthetics at once.  This reconception 
locates the ‘space of history’ (Geschictsraum) within the present, that is, as 
 
 
1 Arendt rejected being called a ‘philosopher’ throughout her career; for instance, see her interview 
with Günter Gaus in The Portable Hannah Arendt, New York: Penguin Books, 2003, 3-4.  For his part, 
Benjamin made this statement early in his career: ‘There is no such thing as art history’. 
2 I am referring to Arendt’s The Life of the Mind, New York: Harcourt, 1978 and Benjamin’s The Arcades 
Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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inseparable from representation, the world of appearance and language.3
As an essential aspect of historiography and aesthetics, ‘transmissibility’ 
provides a way to step beyond the impasse of contemporary critical practice.
  In ways 
that run parallel, part, and lose sight of one another before reapproaching, Benjamin 
and Arendt present us with a mode of thinking about art that insists on the 
inseparability of aesthetics and history.  The stress falls on neither aesthetics nor 
history, but on the and, the conjunction, the bind.  The experience of reading one 
alongside the other underlines what remains to be found amid the ruins of these 
projects: a ‘secret history’ offering itself to a reflection that grasps not facts or truth, 
but the ‘transmissibility’ (Tradierbarkeit) of things. 
4
The concept of transmissibility frames how both Arendt and Benjamin 
approach history and culture.  Benjamin’s clearest articulation of transmissibility 
appears in a letter to Gershom Scholem dated 12 June 1938.  Near the end of the 
letter, he interprets modernity via a synecdochal reading of Kafka, whose work 
‘represents tradition falling ill’.  With modernity, the ‘consistency of truth’—
tradition as such—has been lost.  He writes: ‘Many had accommodated themselves 
to [tradition falling ill], clinging to truth or whatever they happened to regard as 
such, and, with a more or less heavy heart, had renounced transmissibility.  Kafka’s 
real genius was that he tried something entirely new: he sacrificed truth for the sake 
of clinging to transmissibility’.
  
Transmissibility makes possible an interruptive grasping of ‘the past in the present’.  
Although this concept is explicitly associated with Benjamin’s work, it colours the 
entirety of Arendt’s work as well.  Transmissibility demands that we read each with 
and against the other in order to end the ‘state of emergency’ of art and history 
without resorting to eschatology or the histrionics of political theology.  
5
 
3 Benjamin’s phrase the ‘space of history’ is found in The Arcades Project, 458; Gesammelte Schriften, eds. 
Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991, vol. 1, 571. 
  Faced with modernity’s severance of tradition, 
Kafka chose to hold fast not to truth, but to the possibility of transmitting an 
openness to what is absent, to what no longer takes place.  Benjamin, as well as 
Arendt, took from Kafka the lesson that to betray metaphysical truth is to allow 
temporality to transmit itself, that is, to survive in another space and time.  
Furthermore, this lesson inspired them to think a space of history from within the 
aesthetic, the world of artifice.  How are we to characterize this ‘space’— as 
interstice, hiatus, threshold, in-between, gap, or even theatre?  How does it take 
4 Benjamin’s Kantian practice of constructing concepts by adding the suffix –barkeit (-abilities) is the 
subject of Sam Weber’s astounding collection of essays Benjamin’s –abilities, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008.  This text includes an extended discussion of ‘citability’ and Benjamin’s 
philosophy of language, both of which are both premised on ‘impartability’ [Mitteilbarkeit].  Weber 
does not address the ‘transmissibility’ in his text.  My interest in the concept stemmed primarily from 
seminars and conversations with Giorgio Agamben at UCLA as well as the concluding chapter of his 
early book The Man Without Content, trans. Georgia Albert, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.  
5 Benjamin, Briefe, eds. Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrhamp 
Verlag, 1966, vol. 2, 763.  Arendt discusses transmissibility in her ‘Introduction, Walter Benjamin: 1892-
1940’, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, New York: Schocken Books, 1969, 41. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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place within human time, rather than transcend it?  How does transmissibility 
reconfigure how we think about art?  
By theorizing a space of history Arendt and Benjamin aim not to resolder the 
‘chain of tradition’ but to expose transmissibility, that is, an aesthetic-
historiographic originary violence that transmits itself as an openness between past 
and future, poiesis and aisthesis.  Both acknowledge the violence inherent in any 
creative event (including but not limited to the creation of an artwork).  This 
violence marks the event with a ‘temporal index’ that must be grasped by the 
historian, the spectator, who bears witness at a remove.  To cite this index is to seize 
the contending forces of past and future: to read and study the event urgently is to 
instantiate the present, a space of history or worldliness in which thought and 
action are possible.  One consequence of this critical gesture is that transmissibility 
traverses the means-end rationale (Zweckrationalität) that Max Weber and others 
argued is the law of modernity.  Neither Arendt nor Benjamin posit a return to 
traditional aesthetics or art history as a valid response to modernity; instead, they 
both turn their attention to the materiality of art and memory.   
Both intimate that opening this space of history is possible only if we come 
to understand how and why a work of art is the ‘worldliest of all things’.  Arendt’s 
phrase ‘the worldliest of all things’ is meant to stage an aesthetic and political 
critique of modernity.  ‘Worldliness’, she asserts, is ‘the capacity to fabricate and 
create a world’, the ‘space in which things become public’.6  To supplement her 
understanding of art as ‘the worldliest of all things’ Arendt constructed an 
interpretation of Kantian judgment in the postwar period.7
 
6 Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, New York: Penguin Books, 1993, 
209; Portable Arendt, 19.  The phrase ‘the worldliest of all things’ appears in Between Past and Future, 
209.  Arendt’s category of ‘things’ is narrower than Benjamin’s: hers is limited to works of art in a more 
traditional sense, whereas Benjamin’s category extends to a wider range of man-made and mass-
produced objects.  On Benjamin’s understanding of this category see especially Beatrice Hanssen, 
Walter Benjamin’s Other History: Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings, and Angels, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2000.  However, neither desires to maintain a mythic, auratic 
relationship to art, nor do they share the conclusions Martin Heidegger reaches in his meditation on 
the thingness of art.  See Heidegger’s Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter, New York: 
Perennial, 1975.  Many of these issues surrounding varying conceptions of ‘things’ are found in the 
extraordinary collection of essays from the pages of the fall 2001 issue of Critical Inquiry edited by Bill 
Brown.  This collection has been an invaluable point of reference for my study of Benjamin and 
Arendt.  See Brown, ed., Things, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
  Unfortunately, her 
death in 1975 left unfinished her writing on the concept of judgment, which was to 
be the third section of The Life of the Mind.  From this work’s two completed sections 
(‘Thinking’ and ‘Willing’) as well as her notes, lectures, and other essays, it is 
possible to extrapolate how she was conceiving judgment.  I will address this in 
7 Indispensable to any understanding of Arendt’s interpretation of Kantian judgment is the 
introduction to the edited volume Hannah Arendt: Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald 
Beiner, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.  Here Beiner states: ‘Arendt’s 
theory of judging is placed within an overall account of the present historical situation…[in which] 
traditional standards of judgment are no longer authoritative…The supreme danger is abstention from 
judgment, the banality of evil’, 113. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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some detail below, but what is certain is the interdependence of judging and 
thinking; thinking prepares the way for judgment.   
Arendt’s development of judgment betrays a debt to Benjamin.  For instance, 
Arendt uses a quotation from Shakepeare’s The Tempest (Act I, Scene 2) twice in her 
work.  It is found at the conclusion of the section devoted to ‘Thinking’ in The Life of 
the Mind.  At the end of her discussion of thinking, immediately before a 
‘Postscriptum’ on judgment and historiography, she pens an apostrophe to her 
future readers about the ‘fragmented past’.  ‘What has been lost’, she writes, ‘is the 
continuity of the past as it seemed to be handed down from generation to 
generation … What you are then left with is … a fragmented past, which has lost the 
certainty of evaluation’.8
In prompting us to recollect Benjamin the ‘pearl diver’, Arendt emphasizes 
that he chose citation as a means to deal with modernity because it ‘constitutes the 
foundation of the activity of a figure with which [he] felt an instinctive affinity: that 
of the collector’.
  She reminds us that even though dismantling 
metaphysics, aesthetics, and modern history was necessary, it is unwise ‘to destroy’ 
what remains (‘the “rich and strange”, the “coral” and the “pearls”’); instead, it is 
left to us to judge their transmissibility as fragments, which, at least, inscribes hope 
on the face of things to be read.  This Shakespeare quotation is familiar to readers of 
Arendt because she had used it in her introduction of Benjamin to the English-
speaking world in Illuminations (1968).  So even though he is directly cited only once 
in Arendt’s last unfinished treatise, Benjamin’s presence is clearly felt.  Arendt 
begins the last section (‘The Pearl Diver’) of her essay on Benjamin with the same 
quotation from The Tempest before she adds a few remarks that are relevant here: 
‘Insofar as the past has been transmitted as tradition, it possesses authority … 
Walter Benjamin knew that the break in tradition and the loss of authority which 
occurred in his lifetime were irreparable, and he concluded that he had to discover 
new ways of dealing with the past.  In this he became a master when he discovered 
that the transmissibility of the past had been replaced by its citability’.  (38)  
Benjamin’s uniqueness, for Arendt, rests with his ‘ways of dealing with the past’, 
particularly citation.  The recurrence of this Shakespeare quotation suggests that for 
Benjamin transmissibility and citation must be thought together, but also that 
Arendt’s thinking about Benjamin prepared the way for her concept of judgment: 
both citation and judgment are ways of dealing with transmissibility, which 
demands attending to what remains: ‘rich and strange’ things.        
9
 
  In her postwar reminiscence of Benjamin, Arendt addresses 
Benjamin’s interest in collecting a form of ‘profane illumination’ that traverses the 
remnants of aesthetics and history to arrive at the political: 
inasmuch as collecting can fasten on any category of objects [not just art 
objects] … and thus, as it were, redeem the object as a thing since it now is no 
longer a means to an end but has its intrinsic worth, Benjamin could 
 
8 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 212. 
9 Agamben, The Man Without Content, 105. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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understand the collector’s passion as an attitude akin to that of the 
revolutionary … Collecting is the redemption of things which is to complement the 
redemption of man.  (42) 
 
Arendt’s interpretation is neither unfounded nor idiosyncratic; instead, it reveals 
the core of  Benjamin’s theory of collecting by identifying the intimacy between ‘the 
collector’s passion’ and the revolutionary (two figures perhaps reconcilable only in 
Benjamin’s work).  Her insight into the motivation of Benjamin’s ‘genuine collector’ 
(echter Sammler)—how and why it operates by citing the ‘scorned and apocryphal’, 
the outmoded expression (Ausdruck) of modernity, in the present—clarifies her own 
position on judgment.10
Judgment and citation are aesthetic-historiographic terms that demonstrate 
how Arendt and Benjamin think politically about art as a now-here, a time-space, 
wherein the present takes place.  Assisting this event is the ‘Sisyphean task’ of the 
histor, the aesthetic figure of this virtual historiography: Arendt-Benjamin.
  Her assertion that art is ‘the worldliest of all things’ is 
incomprehensible without Benjamin’s ‘genuine collector’ who redeems things by 
judging them.  Simply put, it is impossible to solve the riddle of Arendtian 
judgment without Benjaminian citation.  Inversely, Arendt’s secular humanism may 
help us loosen the hold theology exerts over Benjamin’s conception of citation.  For 
both, redeeming an object (an artwork or any commodity) as a thing deposes the 
traditional technics of aesthetics, historiography, and politics. 
11
 
10 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3: 1935-1938, eds. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, 
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002, 284.  Some notable discussions 
of Benjamin’s figure of the collector are: Eckhardt Köhn, ‘Sammler’ in Benjamins Begriffe: Zweiter Band, 
eds. Michael Opitz and Erdmut Wizisla, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000, 695-724; Esther 
Leslie, ‘Telescoping the Microscopic Object: Benjamin the Collector’, de-, dis-, ex-, vol. 3, 1999, 59-93; 
Michael P. Steinberg, ‘The Collector as Allegorist: Goods, Gods, and the Objects of History’, Walter 
Benjamin and The Demands of History, ed. Michael P. Steinberg, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, 
88-118; Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and The Arcades Project, Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1991; and Douglas Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins, Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1997. 
  A 
retrospective figure of what is to come, this histor maintains a fidelity to what comes 
next, after, or beyond our contemporary impasse by citing what remains.  This 
aesthetic figure is guided by an insight that reveals the paradox of transmissibility 
in its starkest light: passing between what-has-been (das Gewesene) and artifice it 
makes possible an affirmative, creative event of recollection.  This confounds 
historicism while, at the same time, acknowledges that tradition is irreparable.  
11 Aesthetic figures are defined by Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari in What Is Philosophy? New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994, 33.  Aesthetic figures assist conceptual personae, a philosopher’s 
‘heteronyms’.  Examples of conceptual personae are Plato’s ‘Socrates’, Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
‘Zarathustra’ or Descartes ‘the Idiot’.  An aesthetic figure ‘assists’ a conceptual persona by creating 
affects: a presentation of ‘sensory becoming’ by which ‘something or someone is ceaselessly becoming-
other (while continuing to be what they are)’.  For Deleuze and Guattari, more important than any 
difference between conceptual personae and aesthetic figures is the overall construction of thought, 
that is, the ways in which aesthetic figures assist ‘the task of philosophy’: ‘to extract an event from 
things and beings’. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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Judgment and citation here signify aesthetic-historiographic becomings wherein a 
space of history opens between an event and its representation.  This is the promise 
of transmissibility.12  Within the space of history, the sphere of spectators and 
actors, there is not consensus (despite Arendt’s wish); rather, there must be 
dissensus, argument, discourse, ethics.  This commonplace is so only if it is 
massenweise: virtual not artificial, particular not universal, political not solipsistic.13  
Our inheritance, then, is this histor who understands how and why Benjamin’s 
genuine collector’s stance is ‘in the highest sense, the attitude of an heir’.14
 
  What 
becomes of art history and philosophy lies in-between, which opens only in an 
originary violence that rends any relation, that renders us inheritors of ‘pearls’.  
II.   
 
Despite the incompleteness of Arendt’s writing about judgment, the concept itself is 
well-developed in her work.  She addresses it in the finished sections of The Life of 
the Mind as well as in a series of lectures published as Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy in 1982.  The earliest iteration of judging appears in her essay ‘The Crisis 
of Culture: Its Social and Its Political Significance’ (1960) where judgment is a 
strategy to confront mass society, that is, the absence of culture and politics.  To 
diagnose this depoliticized mass society, Arendt undertakes an historical 
examination of culture (art in particular) that traces its reduction to a ‘cultural’ 
commodity in the postwar period.  Postwar mass society represents the apotheosis 
of Homo faber.  She summarizes: 
 
 
12 I would like to add that this promise has also been developed in another context by Georges Didi-
Huberman in Images in Spite of All: Four Photographs From Auschwitz, trans. Shane B. Lillis, Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008.  Here he implicitly supports the ethical connections 
between transmissibility and art historiography.  In discussing four images taken from within a gas 
chamber at Auschwitz by a member of the Sonderkommando Didi-Huberman argues: ‘If the risk they 
took signifies the hope they placed in such a transmission of images, should we not take this 
transmission itself very seriously, and concentrate attentively on the images in question, not as 
deceptive artifacts but rather as “instants of truth”, whose importance was emphasized by Arendt and 
Benjamin?’, 62.  In addition to binding transmissibility, Benjamin, and Arendt together, he also cites a 
passage from Arendt that underscores my reading: ‘Lacking the truth, [we] will however find instants 
of truth, and those instants are in fact all we have available to us to give some order to this chaos of 
horror.  These instants arise spontaneously, like oases in the desert’, 31. 
13 Weber develops this concept of ‘massenweise’ from Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility” in Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Media, Stanford: Stanford  
University Press,, 1996, 76-107.  My thinking here is also informed by the work of Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri on the concept of the ‘common’; see Commonwealth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009.  In fact, despite clear differences with Arendt, Hardt and Negri clarify their 
concept of the common by stating: ‘We agree in this regard with Hannah Arendt’s conception of 
politics as the interaction and composition of singularities in a common world’. 
14 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1927-1934, eds. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary 
Smith, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999, 491. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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The moment this point of view [fabrication, means to an end, use value] is 
generalized and extended to other realms … [it] threatens not only the 
political realm … it also threatens the cultural realm itself because it leads to 
a devaluation of things as things which … degenerate into mere means.15
 
 
Arendt’s position that the ‘devaluation of things as things’ indicates the loss of 
culture and tradition (‘the thread of tradition is broken’) must be interpreted against 
her claim that art is ‘the worldliest of all things’, that is, ‘fabricated not for men, but 
for the world’.  (209)  She measures the distance between politics (a ‘world’), which 
requires culture, and depoliticized, anomic mass society that demands everything 
be consumed, valued only in terms of whether or not it serves some presupposed 
end (be it biological, psychological, or even aesthetic).  In contemporary mass 
society we are never free from ‘all the cares and activities of the life process’, which 
extend into an all-consuming affair.16
Beginning with ‘The Crisis of Culture’ and continuing through her 
unfinished opus, Arendt sought to construct a political philosophy (a Kantian 
theory of political judgment) from Kant’s aesthetic philosophy.
  In short, we are never ‘free for the world and 
its culture’.  (205)  The transformation of art into an image-commodity—into just 
another element of a society of spectacle—goes hand-in-hand with a loss of history, 
a loss of ‘the world once common to [us] all’.  (90)  ‘In the situation of radical world-
alienation’, Arendt writes, ‘the loss of nature and the loss of human artifice in the 
widest sense, which would include all history—has left behind it a society of men … 
without a common world which would at once relate and separate them’.  (89)  
Arendt’s discussion of art as an exception to this rule, as something outside the ‘life 
process’ inextricable from history itself, is wholly dependent on the Kantian notion 
of judgment.  
17  Her entire 
discussion of judging employs the Kantian language of aesthetic judgment (taste as 
communicable, without an antecedent universality).  However, unlike political 
action, which must take into account its ends, judgment must ‘abstract from any 
consideration of ends; aesthetic judgment must make no reference to teleology’.18
 
15 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 216. 
  
Aesthetic judgment is impartial and privileges taste over genius (in Kant’s terms); 
whereas political judgment, premised on action, is inseparable from ends and aims.  
The question is whether or not it is possible, as Arendt claims, to move from the 
16 Arendt adds: ‘Mass culture comes into being when mass society…consume[s] the cultural objects, 
eats them up and destroys them’, 207. 
17 The idea of a virtual Kantian philosophy marks another commonality with Benjamin.  As is well 
known, Benjamin characterized his own ‘coming philosophy’ as originating in Kantian experience.  See 
Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-1926, eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996, 100-110.  In a letter to Scholem from 1917 he 
writes: ‘Whoever doesn’t … treat [Kant] with the utmost respect, literally, as a tradendum—to be 
transmitted and passed down (no matter how much he must subsequently be reshaped), understands 
absolutely nothing of philosophy’ (cited in Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities, 11; see Briefe vol. 1, 150). 
18 Beiner, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 135. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
8 
 
aesthetic to the political via Kantian judgment.  Because Arendt decides to make 
this move, she has to side with the spectator (world-citizen) over the agent or 
enactor, as evidenced by her shift from arguing for an ‘act of judging’ with 
connotations of action (political) to a ‘faculty of judgment’ (a capacity of the mind).19  
Despite this qualitative reconsideration of judging, she is determined to extract 
from Kantian aesthetic judgment a general ‘faculty of judgment’ that, while not 
political in and of itself, would be on the side of politics.20
Arendt defines this faculty of judgment as ‘the most political of man’s 
mental abilities’ because it deals with particulars (events) without subsuming them 
under general rules; it is the ethical dimension of thought.  By aligning judgment 
with thinking she invests in the political aspects of retrospection and historiography 
because the ‘movement of thinking loosens the hold of universals … and thus frees 
judgment to operate in an open space of moral and aesthetic discrimination and 
discernment’.
  
21  In her schema judging requires thinking as well as communicating 
one’s position about a past event.  Judgment is contemplative, retrospective action: 
a spectator is at a remove from the event (work of art or political decision) and thus 
can presumably be disinterested, meaning, in part, open to memory.  As Julia 
Kristeva points out, for Arendt the ‘spectators are the ones who “accomplish” 
history, thanks to a thought that follows the act.  This accomplishment takes place 
through recollection, without which there is simply nothing to recount’.22
History cannot be the ‘ultimate judge’ because, for Arendt, judgment signals 
our desire to take responsibility for the past as such; to interrupt the autotelic 
movement of ‘Progress’ by recognizing the rights and obligations of the spectator, 
not just the actor.  ‘If judgment is our faculty for dealing with the past, the 
historian’, she argues, ‘is the inquiring man who by relating [the past] sits in 
judgment over it.  If that is so, we may reclaim our human dignity, win it back as it 
were, from the pseudo-divinity named History … without denying history’s 
  If the 
spectator-judge must recollect and be impartial, then no conceptual deus ex machina 
such as ‘History’ itself can guarantee meaning in advance.  Thus, a political aspect 
of  judgment reveals itself as an implicit critique of any philosophy of history that 
supplants individual mental activity with the ‘pseudo-divinity’ called ‘Progress’ or 
‘History’.  
 
19 Beiner astutely lays out this terrain in his interpretative essay; see 93-4. 
20 Since Arendt’s appropriation of Kantian reflective judgment has been the subject of insightful and 
often pointed critiques by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas, among others, I will not go 
into the full assessment of it here.  From the perspective of art history and aesthetics, Karen Lang’s 
Chaos and Cosmos: On the Image in Aesthetics and Art History, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006, is a 
valuable text that deals in part with the problems of Arendt’s attempt to construct a political 
philosophy on a foundation of Kantian judgment.  
21 Beiner, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 112. 
22 Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, trans. Ross Guberman, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, 
72. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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importance but denying its right to being the ultimate judge’.23  Such an argument 
represses even Kant’s own philosophy of history.24  Not only does she refuse to 
confront fully Kant’s philosophy of history, she rejects every philosophy of history 
whose ‘subject is not individual citizens but the human species taken as a whole’, 
including those of Vico, Hegel, and Marx.25  Arendt claims that when the subject of 
any philosophy of history is the human species as such or, worse yet, some 
overarching concept like the ‘Spirit’, we cannot judge past events in their 
particularity and, therefore, they are incommunicable.  This is her objection to any 
philosophy of history: each is end-driven, unworldly and, in a real sense, only an 
aestheticization of politics.  Arendt resists Kant’s reliance on a metaphysical 
teleology to assure the coming of a universal cosmopolitan world-citizen, in 
particular, and the unrelenting emphasis on process—teleology as a technics of 
politics—in Kant, Hegel, Marx, and others in general, because each forfeits 
singularity by overwriting it in advance with the end.  She concludes that with 
teleology the ‘process alone makes meaningful whatever it happens to carry along’ 
and acquires ‘a monopoly of universality and significance’.26
Although Arendt’s dismantling of the modern concept of history may not 
have resulted in a comprehensive political philosophy, her elaboration of judgment 
provides a reconsideration of the implicit political aspect of art.  She avers that 
  Consequently she 
gives the notion of judging two inseparable tasks: to interrupt any formalized 
historical process and to assist the creation of a world.  Thus, judging as 
interruption is ‘one, if not the most, important activity in which sharing-the-world-
with-others comes to pass’.  (221) 
 
23 Arendt, Life of the Mind, 216.  In texts such as On Revolution, New York: Viking Press, 1965, Arendt’s 
demonstrates her point.  The failures of historical actors (e.g., Paris Commune of 1871) are still events 
that must be rescued from the ‘oblivion of history, thereby salvaging a portion of human dignity’.  
‘Events of this kind possess what Arendt, following Kant, calls “exemplary validity”.  By attending to 
the particular qua particular, in the form of an “example”, the judging spectator is able to illuminate 
the universal without thereby reducing the particular to universals’, Beiner, Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy, 127. 
24 See Paul Ricoeur, ‘Aesthetic Judgment and Political Judgment According to Hannah Arendt’ in The  
Just, trans. David Pellauer, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000, 94-108.  Here 
Ricoeur pinpoints Arendt’s repression of Kant’s own philosophy of history as precisely what disables 
her extension of aesthetic judgment into a political theory.  His critique is decisive when he argues that 
without reference to Kant’s philosophy of history, notably his Idea for a Universal History from a 
Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784), which predates The Critique of Judgment (1790), Arendt simply cannot 
justify extending aesthetic judgment into a political one.  Ricoeur shows that Kant’s work on the 
philosophy of history utilizes much of the conceptual language that reappears in The Critique of 
Judgment, especially communicability, plurality, and the exemplarity of the particular.  In addition, he 
stresses the necessity of distinguishing between reflection and retrospection.  While Arendt 
characterizes judgment as retrospective, reflecting on past events grants a critical distance essential to 
future political judgment.  By foregrounding the connection Kant makes between reflection and hope 
in his philosophy of history, Ricoeur asserts that he forwarded a ‘disposition’ that would reconcile the 
teleological and the cosmopolitan points of view.   
25 Ricoeur, ‘Aesthetic Judgment’, 103. 
26 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 64. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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judging is a truly human praxis oriented towards past events, including the creation 
of works of art, ‘the worldliest of all things’.  Whereas the continuum of past and 
future, without present, depends on the ‘business of everyday life’, which is 
‘indifferent to the thingness of an object’, judgment engages artworks as things, as 
the material presence of the historical process gone awry, as an exception to the rule 
of means-end necessity and consumption (208).  For Arendt, a work of art allows 
each individual to sense a structural gap between past and future; thereby making 
possible the creation of a world.  Judgment shelters art from any world-historical 
process, but providing it asylum is only possible if we can ‘forget ourselves, our 
cares and the interests and urges of our lives, so that we will not seize what we 
admire but let it be as it is, in its appearance’.27
The work of art does not lie between the past and future; rather, it scumbles 
the tenses because it is transmittable.  Art transmits the disquiet of the past (to play 
on Hegel’s phrase ‘the quiet of the past’) to the future.  This disquiet of the past—its 
haunting, repetitive aspect—is a clamor that causes anxiety and dread as much as 
the unknown future does.  Judgment is the faculty that faces this disquiet; it 
responds to the vital transmissibility of the past by attempting to found a present 
wherein humanity possesses the ‘full actuality’ of its being.  Such an act is 
suggested by one of Arendt’s favorite parables by Kafka:  
  To let art be in its appearance is not 
merely an ontological experience or simply one of leisure; rather, it enacts an 
aesthetic-political strike against mass society and its temporality.  It is a momentary 
experience that exposes how and why ‘the full actuality’ of humanity is only 
attainable if we learn to live in this gap of time between past and future (13). 
 
He has two antagonists; the first presses him from behind, from his origin.  
The second blocks the road in front of him.  He gives battle to both … His 
dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment—and this, it 
must be admitted, would require a night darker than any other night has 
ever been yet—he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on 
account of his experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his 
antagonists in their fight with each other.28
 
 
Much of Arendt’s political philosophy, especially as it relates to history and art, is 
inscribed in this ‘thought-event.’  She characterizes these ‘antagonists’ as the past 
(pressing him from his origin) and the future (blocking the road before him, coming 
towards him as in the German Zukunft and the French avenir).  Arendt explains: ‘In 
other words, the time continuum … is broken up into the tenses past, present, 
future, whereby past and future are antagonistic to each other as the no-longer and 
the not-yet only because of the presence of man, who himself has an “origin” … this 
 
27 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 201.  By ‘seize’ Arendt means to force it into some predetermined 
utility. 
28 Kafka’s parable ‘HE’ is cited by Arendt twice; see Between Past and Future, 7, and Life of the Mind, 202. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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in-between is called the present’.29  The present is a battleground.  She intimates that 
the unimaginable ‘dark night’—contemporaneity—is created, in fact, by our 
removal from the fight.  For this reason Arendt rejects the dream of Kafka’s 
character to ‘be promoted’ to the ‘position of umpire’, insisting that we must not 
acquiesce to these forces.  For Kafka’s dreamer Arendt substitutes a ‘fighter’, one 
who judges, one who is not ‘a passive object inserted into the stream, to be tossed 
about by its waves’, but who ‘defends his own presence and thus defines … “his” 
antagonists … without “him”, there would be no difference between past and 
future’.30  The fighter creates the present by interrupting the flow of contending 
forces (past and future), and resisting the equilibrium that would create a timeless, 
unchanging eternity.31
A certain tension exists between Arendt and Benjamin regarding this ‘gap’ 
or present: Benjamin firmly locates it within historical time whereas she wavers 
between Benjamin’s view and concluding that this gap or ‘time-sensation’ only 
occurs in thought.  In the thirteenth thesis on the philosophy of history Benjamin 
makes a contrasting statement.  ‘History’, he writes, is ‘the subject of a structure 
whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled with the presence of the 
now [Jetztzeit]’.
  
32  This Jetztzeit or now-time is not merely the present (Gegenwart) 
and, moreover, it appears precisely within historical time.  For her part, Arendt 
wagers that this ‘small non-time space in the very heart of time’ is not possible in 
historical or biographical time.  She claims that only insofar as an individual thinks 
can one ‘live in this gap between past and future, in this present which is timeless’.33
 
  
Whereas culture and the world can be inherited and handed down by tradition this 
small non-time space cannot be: ‘Each new generation, every new human being … 
must discover and ploddingly pave anew the path of thought’.  (210)  Arendt adds 
that although this gap between past and future cannot be inherited or handed down 
by tradition ‘every great book of thought points to it somewhat cryptically’.  (210)  
She speculates that 
the strange survival of great works … is due to their having been born in the 
small, inconspicuous track of non-time which their author’s thought had 
beaten between an infinite past and an infinite future by accepting past and 
future as directed, aimed, as it were, at themselves—as their predecessors 
and successors, their past and their future—thus establishing a present for 
themselves.  (210-1) 
 
 
29 Arendt, Life of the Mind, 203. 
30 Arendt, Life of the Mind, 207-8. 
31 Although originating in the medieval philosophy of Duns Scotus, whom Arendt admired, as a nunc 
stans (‘standing now’), this ‘gap’ is ‘not a model and metaphor of divine eternity’ nor is it ‘a historical 
datum’; rather, it ‘seems to be coeval with the existence of man on earth’, Life of the Mind, 210. 
32 Benjamin, Illuminations, 261. 
33 Arendt, Life of the Mind, 210. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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Despite her claim that this gap is not inheritable, does not Arendt suggest that 
works of art survive because they shelter their own natality so to speak, their own 
origin?  Is this not part of the lesson of transmissibility learned from Kafka?  It is not 
so much the physical appearance of this temporal aporia in a work of art as much as 
its very possibility, which ‘springs … from the clash of past and future’.  (211)  After 
the fragmentation of the past, what then are we to judge? a world of appearance 
that only confirms a melancholic act of salvage?  No.  We are to judge whether or 
not this temporal aporia is present, dislocating the even semblance of tradition.   
According to Arendt, works of art are not culture or tradition as such, but 
only fragments that allow us to recollect ‘the continuity of the past as it seemed 
handed down from generation to generation’. (212)  This is transmissibility.  Works 
of art possess a certain potency not because of the historical continuity they write, 
but because their very creation—the action of genius and poiesis—has its origin in 
this temporal aporia.  For us, on the side of taste and aisthesis, reflecting on the 
fragmented past, it is left to judge not the formal structure or expression of the 
artwork, but the trace of that openness to the future, to what is never fully present 
but sent ahead, forwarded.  To judge this trace or fragment means grasping the 
work of art as a particularity, as an example (Bei-spiel), that plays beside itself, that 
plays between imagination and understanding, between poiesis and aisthesis, 
between past and future.  This between is the detour of transmissibility, which takes 
place only where it deposes itself momentarily.  Judgments are a second-order 
interruption; they intervene in a situation dictated by absence and by a fundamental 
rupture that has disclosed tradition.  To judge a work of art is to think the relation 
between past and future as an ontological act that borders on the political: the 
gesture of an aesthetic-historiography to come. 
Arendt gives her judging figure, constructed from pre-modern culture and 
Kantian philosophy, a name retrieved from the artistic and historiographic registers 
of antiquity: histor.  The etymology of the concept ‘history’, she explains, is ‘Greek in 
origin and derived from historein, to inquire in order to tell how it was—legein ta 
eonta in Herodotus.  But the origin of this verb is again Homer (Iliad XVIII) where 
the noun histor (“historian”, as it were) occurs, and that Homeric historian is the 
judge’.  (216)  At stake in this act of naming is ‘a whole set of problems by which 
modern thought is haunted, especially the problem of theory and practice and all 
attempts to arrive at a halfway plausible theory of ethics’.  (216)  Judgment is not 
knowledge; it is the ethical activity of the histor who defends ‘this small track of 
non-time’ to save things ‘from the ruin of historical and biographical time’.34  
Arendt’s histor narrates singularities (events, artworks) in order to transcend 
historical and biographical time.35
 
34 Arendt, Life of the Mind, 211; Between Past and Future, 13. 
  But is it not possible to conceive of this activity 
35 Narrative is essential to Arendt’s political philosophy.  As I do not have the space here to address it 
fully I will only cite from Kristeva’s remarkable ‘Life as a Narrative’ in Hannah Arendt where she 
distinguishes Arendt’s take on narrative from the narrative theory of historians like Paul Ricoeur and 
others: ‘For Arendt, political life may be inseparable from the narrative that makes its conflicts visible Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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without transcending human temporality?  Arendt overlooks how Benjamin’s 
‘philosophy of history’, which certainly shares her disdain of teleology, maintains a 
structure of temporal immanence.  To Arendt’s figure of the histor I would add two 
elements of Benjamin’s materialist historiography: first, his ‘constructive principle’ 
that thinking ‘involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well’, that 
is, ‘to blast open the continuum of history’; second, his ‘cautious detachment’ from 
cultural treasures, that is, inversely his genuine collector’s attentiveness 
(Aufmerksamkeit) to kitsch and outmoded commodities.36  Admittedly, the latter 
made Arendt somewhat uneasy, but without her, Benjamin’s desire ‘to capture the 
portrait of history in the most insignificant  representations of reality, its scraps, as it 
were’ would not illuminate a passage beyond negative dialectics, beyond the 
eschatology of the contemporary.37
 
  
III. 
 
In order to understand Benjamin’s desire to read these ‘scraps’ as a kind of ‘portrait 
of history’ it is best to begin with a quotation characterizing his genuine collector: 
‘Some make things transmittable (this marks the conservative nature of all 
collectors), others make situations handy, citable [zitierbar] so to speak: these are the 
destructive characters’.38
                                                                                                                                          
to each spectator, but only to the extent that political life can resist its own aestheticization, can be 
conceived as an “activity” (praxis) that cannot be reduced to its own “product” (poiesis), and can allow 
itself to be shared by the irreducible plurality of human being’, 94-5. 
  A distinction is made here between the figure of the 
collector, who makes things ‘transmissible’ (tradierbar), and the ‘destructive 
character’ who makes situations ‘citable’ (zitierbar).  However, this is not a simple 
distinction.  In considering the concept of transmissibility (Tradierbarkeit), Benjamin 
first turns to the figure of the collector and attempts to think the relation between 
the present and the past as a relation between a collector and his objects.  In place of 
the nineteenth-century caricature of the collector as a sort of hapless, fetishistic 
antiquarian or as an inveterate souvenir hunter, Benjamin reconciles two seemingly 
opposite figures—the bourgeois collector and the destructive character—into a 
‘genuine collector’ in-between ‘The Destructive Character’ and the other crucial 
essay from the same year (1931), ‘Unpacking My Library: A Talk about Book 
Collecting’.  While the latter is more well-known and often taken as his definitive 
statement on collecting, it remains incomplete without the former, as Benjamin 
36 Benjamin, Illuminations, 262, 256. 
37 Cited in Arendt, ‘Introduction’, 11.  In ‘The Crisis of Culture’ Arendt says that the ‘intellectualization 
of kitsch’ [quoting Harold Rosenberg] is ‘justified on the grounds that mass society, whether we like it 
or not, is going to stay with us into the foreseeable future; hence its “culture”, “popular culture 
[cannot] be left to the populace”’, 197.  Her essay questions whether or not the relationship between 
‘mass society and culture will be … the same as the relation of society toward the culture that 
preceded it’. 
38 Benjamin, SW  2, 542.  ‘Einige machen die Dinge tradierbar (das sind vor allem die Sammler, 
konservative, konservierende Naturen), andere machen Situationen handlich, zitierbar sozusagen: das 
sind die destruktiven Charaktere’, GS IV:2, 1000. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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makes clear in his assertion that ‘collectors are people with a tactical instinct’: that 
is, the ‘true, greatly misunderstood passion of the collector is always anarchistic, 
destructive’.  (489; GS III, 216)  This ‘tactical instinct’ is absolutely necessary to the 
activity of the destructive character, who is also curiously a ‘traditionalist’.39
By closely examining the intertextuality between the essay on book 
collecting and the essay on the early modern Austrian writer Karl Kraus, it becomes 
apparent that Benjamin’s decision to align the gesture of collecting—
transmissibility—with citation is supported by his theory of language.
  This 
complementarity of destruction and preservation presents Benjamin’s genuine 
collector as one who wields a critical form of memory (recollection) by citing the 
transmitted elements of the past in the present.   
40  For 
Benjamin, citation is exemplified by the work of Kraus, who gives citation an 
‘unmistakable aggressive force’.41  In ‘Unpacking My Library’, Benjamin writes that 
only in private collections do ‘objects get their due’.42  In a ‘genuine collection’ 
things ‘get their due’ because they are not merely transmitted from the past, but 
rather they are cited in the present, thereby robbing modernity of the semblance of 
tradition it feigns.  The translation of the German phrase ‘ihrem Recht’  as ‘get their 
due’ misses the allusion to justice (judgment), which forges a conceptual link with 
citation.43  Citation denotes both an act of quoting and a juridical, even theological, 
summons.  Thus, in his essay on Kraus, while discussing citation, we find a phrase 
similar to ‘ihrem Recht’.  In defining Kraus’s ‘basic polemical procedure’ Benjamin 
writes: ‘A single line, and not even one of his, is enough to enable Kraus to descend, 
as saviour, into this inferno … In the quotation that both saves and punishes, 
language proves the matrix of justice’.44  Here we see the phrase ‘die Mater der 
Gerechtigkeit’, ‘the matrix of justice’.  The semantic link between ‘Recht’ and 
‘Gerechtigkeit’ is crucial because this connotation of judgment colours Benjamin’s 
thoughts on a ‘genuine collection’, which exists in relation to the true ‘matrix of 
justice’: language as such.45
 
39 Benjamin writes that the ‘destructive character stands in the frontline of traditionalists’, SW 2, 542. 
 
40 See particularly Benjamin’s ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’ in SW 1. 
41 Recall Benjamin’s memorable line: ‘Quotations in my work are like wayside robbers who leap out, 
armed, and rob the idle stroller of his conviction’, SW 1, 481. 
42 Benjamin, SW 2, 491. 
43 Benjamin, GS IV:1, 395.  Citation and judgment are explicitly bound in Benjamin’s thought: ‘To be 
sure, only a redeemed mankind receives the fullness of the past—which is to say, only for a redeemed 
mankind has its past become citable in all its moments.  Each moment it has lived becomes a citation à 
l’ordre du jour—and that day is Judgment Day’, Illuminations, 254. 
44 Benjamin, SW 2, 453, 454. 
45 Benjamin explicitly associates Kraus’ use of citation with ‘a Platonic love of language’ (SW 2, 453).  
The Platonic Thing, ‘the thing of thinking’ is ‘the very opening in which something like a tradition is 
possible’; see Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999, 104, 105.  ‘The thing itself’, Agamben adds, ‘therefore has its essential place in language, even if 
language is certainly not adequate to it, on account, Plato says, of what is weak in language.  One 
could say, with an apparent paradox, that the thing itself, while in some way transcending language, is 
nevertheless possible only in language and by virtue of language: precisely the thing of language’. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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The transition between Benjamin’s philosophies of language and history is 
only possible though citation, which unlike transmissibility, preserves a relation to 
the original context and/or experience by its destructiveness.  If in citation ‘the two 
realms—of origin and destruction—justify themselves before language’, then there 
is a logic of immanence at play in the temporality of modernity, that is, not one 
epoch superseding the next, not a relation of archē and telos, but instead an 
immanent temporal structure laced with singularity and repetition, alterity and 
movement.46  This logic reinforces Benjamin’s discussion of origin (Ursprung).  He 
asserts that the type of critical history he desires ‘distinguishes that which concerns 
us as originary in historical experience from the pieced-together findings of the 
factual.  “What is original [ursprünglich] never allows itself to be recognized in the 
naked, obvious existence of the factual; its rhythm is accessible only to a dual 
insight.  This insight … concerns the fore-history and after-history of the 
original”’.47  In contrast to the historicist alluded to in the phrase ‘pieced-together 
findings of the factual’, Benjamin’s genuine collector has the Sisyphean task of 
rendering things citable, that is, grasping the transmission of the past as a situation 
wherein fore- and after-history reveals an ‘origin’ that survives in the present.  
Citation destroys the illusion of any discrete temporal context with the uncanny 
presence of the what-has-been, which is immanent within any and every 
instantiation of a present.  The goal of citation is ‘not to preserve, but to purify, to 
tear from context, to destroy’.48
Genuine collecting, therefore, is neither hysterical, pathological 
collectionism, nor is it symptomatic of a taedium vitae.
  A citation robs the past of any pretense of 
completion—of any claim to posit itself—by rendering it incapable of fulfilling itself 
in the present; it does not transmit the past as much as force it to take place as 
irretrievable.  Thus, the paradox of the genuine collector, who dwells with the 
particular in the world of appearance, is a recognition that both transmissibility and 
citation coalesce as ‘the only power in which hope still resides that something might 
survive this age—because it was wrenched from it’.  (455) 
49  On the contrary, the 
genuine collector, with a ‘fidelity to things and to the individual’, enacts ‘an 
obstinate, subversive protest against the typical, the classifiable’.50
 
46 Benjamin, SW 2, 454. 
  Quite unlike the 
stereotypical antiquarian figure, the genuine collector collects objects that are 
‘scorned and apocryphal’, that is, objects without any presupposed aesthetic and 
economic value.  By collecting things without presupposed value, a genuine 
collector dwells destructively in ‘a mysterious relation to ownership’ that challenges 
47 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne, London and New York: Verso, 
1999, 45-6. 
48 Benjamin, SW 2, 455. 
49 In Convolute H of The Arcades Project, Benjamin contrasts ‘collectionism’ (denoting as a neurological 
disorder, a “mania”) with collecting done by children, which approaches his idea of genuine collecting 
(208). 
50 Benjamin, GS III, 216. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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the historicism of commodity culture, specifically its pathological means-end logic.51  
Simply put, Benjamin wagers that the ‘scorned and apocryphal’—the insignificant 
(Ausdruck)—transmit the expressionless (Ausdruckslose) ‘origin’ of modernity.52
In the précis to his unfinished archaeology of modernity, The Arcades Project, 
Benjamin characterizes the activity of collecting as something akin to Sisyphus’s 
punitive, repetitive task.  Rather than a hopeless undertaking, Benjamin views 
collecting as a situation from which an event of dispossession and rescue can arise.  
As he explains:   
 
 
The collector … makes his concern the enlightenment [die Verklärung] of 
things.  To him falls the Sisyphean task of divesting things of their 
commodity character by taking possession of them.  But he bestows on them 
only a collector’s value [den Lieberhaberwert], rather than use value.  The 
collector dreams his way not only into a distant or bygone world but also 
into a better on … in which things are freed from the drudgery of being 
useful.53
 
 
At the center of this Sisyphean task is transmissibility, which shelters within itself a 
dislocating, disappropriating form of memory.  As Benjamin tells us, even though 
‘ownership is the most intimate relationship that one can have to things’, the 
‘collector’s passion borders on the chaos of memories’.54  Thus, to actualize another 
form of ownership one must confront this ‘chaos of memories’ and extract from it a 
relation to things that ‘does not emphasize their functional, utilitarian value—that 
is, their usefulness—but studies and loves them as the scene, the stage, of their fate’.55
 
51 Benjamin states that a collector’s very being (das Dasein des Sammlers) is ‘a mysterious relation to 
ownership’ (SW 2, 487; GS IV:1, 387).  Some of the phrases I am using in this section such as 
antiquarian and critical history allude to a text often cited by Benjamin: Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Use 
and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins, New York: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1957.  I deal with 
this intersection more substantially in the first chapter of my The Gesture of Collecting: Walter Benjamin 
and Contemporary Aesthetics, forthcoming. 
  
Benjamin’s collector’s value is a form of ethico-political memory that ‘studies and 
loves’ things by recollecting their evocative existence, that is, the interpolative 
presence of things dispossessed of their use value.  In the French version of the 
précis, written four years after the original, Benjamin increases the emphasis on 
52 Benjamin’s phrase from ‘Unpacking My Library’—‘esteem for the insignificant [Ausdruck]’—shows 
this semantic connection.  See SW 2, 668 and GS III, 366.  With words reminiscent of his explanation of 
the destructive character, Benjamin defines das Ausdruckslose as ‘the critical violence’ in which ‘the 
sublime violence of the true appears as that which determines the language of the real world according 
to the laws of the moral world … Only the expressionless completes the work, by shattering it into a 
thing of shards’, SW 1, 340.  See also Winfried Menninghaus, ‘Das Ausdruckslose: Walter Benjamins 
Kritik des Schönen durch das Erhabene’ in Walter Benjamin 1892-1940 zum 100 Geburtstag, ed. Uwe 
Steiner, Berlin: Peter Lang, 1992, 33-76.   
53 Translation emended; see Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 9 and GS V:1, 53. 
54 Benjamin, SW 2, 492, 486. 
55 Italics mine; SW 2, 487.  As ‘collectors are physiognomists of the world of things’ they ‘turn into 
interpreters of fate’, Benjamin adds.  See also his essay ‘Fate and Character’ (1921) in SW 1. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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memory by a slight change to the passage cited above.  The phrase ‘The collector 
dreams his way’ becomes ‘Le collectionneur se plaît à susciter un monde’: the 
collector evokes a better world.56  By evoking or rousing another world, the collector 
presents objects without any use; they are only ciphers of this other world.  
Collected things are not symbols of this other world; rather, they are stop-gaps 
within the present (modernity) indicating the immanence of the what-has-been (das 
Gewesene), the ‘unlived’ as opposed to the ‘lived’ experience of the past within the 
present.57  The French text moves the collector’s value away from a simple notion of 
‘dreaming’ by foregrounding memory, because the act of evocation carries a 
connotation of recollection, of calling to mind.  The Sisyphean task can thus be 
refined: it deposes any utilitarian notion of memory or possession, thereby opening 
a threshold between individual and collective memory that presses the ‘nether side’ 
of the past—the what-has-been—toward light.  This threshold is opened because 
things are not simply souvenirs of the past, memories of what has occurred; rather, 
they are colophons of that which can never be remembered, oblivion.  In other 
words, the task Benjamin sets the genuine collector is to recollect the irretrievability 
of the what-has-been, to bear in mind the calculus of relation between the present 
and the sheer unwieldy amount of ‘historical happenings’ that exceeds the frame of 
the historicist past.58
Benjamin names his alternative concept of memory ‘recollection’ 
(Eingedenken), which implies bearing something in mind.  Recollection signifies less 
a form of projective wish-fulfillment than a historiographic, ethical responsibility.  
To bear something in mind is not to simply to make it present; quite the contrary, 
recollection recalls nothing but the fact that something is absent.  A recollection is 
the index of absence; it bears in mind that which must be borne.  Benjamin’s 
genuine collector maintains a relation with the what-has-been, that which cannot be 
recalled.  To be faithful to what has been forgotten so that it becomes unforgettable 
is the vocation of the genuine collector.
 
59
 
56 Benjamin, GS V:1, 67.  
  Thus, (re-)collecting is a destructive 
gesture, a form of critical historiography, whose decisive motivation is, 
paradoxically, not accumulation but attrition: that is, an ascetic attentiveness to the 
57 This idea of the what-has-been arises from Benjamin’s distrust in any representation of the past.  
Rather than presume to represent the past ‘as it truly was’—a presumption he refers to as the narcotic 
of nineteenth-century historicism—Benjamin’s materialist philosophy of history attempts to deal with 
the what-has been, which is irreducible to what is commonly referred to as the past.  See especially 
Convolute N of The Arcades Project. 
58 The ‘irretrievability of the past’ is discussed in Benjamin’s essay ‘A Berlin Childhood around 1900’, 
SW 3, 344.  I have written on this concept in ‘The Immemorial, or The Pit of Babel: On W.G. Sebald’s 
Photographs’ Deixis, vol. 1, Spring, 2007. 
59 For this understanding of vocation I am indebted to Agamben.  See his Idea of Prose, trans. Michael 
Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.  He concludes: ‘Fidelity 
to that which cannot be thematized, nor simply passed over in silence, is a betrayal of a sacred kind, in 
which memory, spinning suddenly like a whirlwind, uncovers the hoary forehead of oblivion.  This 
attitude, this reverse embrace of memory and forgetting which holds intact the identity of the unrecalled and the 
unforgettable, is vocation’, italics mine, 45. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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unstable, to the liminal things that are homeless within human history.  Playing 
with the detritus of human history, genuine collecting accepts discontinuity.  In fact, 
instead of transmitting only discontinuity, the atopos or obliviousness of things, the 
gesture of collecting is citation, which opens a caesura within time by seizing the 
movement between the what-has-been and the future.   
The genuine collector (re-)collects with an attentiveness to larger, collective 
desires that remain unfulfilled within modernity.  ‘A collector lives a piece of dream 
life’, Benjamin writes.60  In conceiving modernity as a ‘dreamtime’ (Zeit-traum), 
Benjamin desires to develop ‘the art of experiencing the present as waking world, a 
world to which that dream we name the past refers in truth’ because ‘awakening is 
namely the dialectical, Copernican turn of recollection [die dialektische, 
kopernikanische Wendung des Eingedenkens]’.61  In the threshold between habit and 
attentiveness there is ‘ein Stuck Traumleben’ that must be grasped in an awakened 
state.  With each new acquisition, each new thing, what was habitual (the presence 
of mere things) becomes the focus of attention.  The genuine collector recollects not 
the dream, but rather the ‘fragment of another history’—that to which we are 
oblivious—existing within the present; not as dream, but as a dislocating presence at 
the heart of modernity.62
For Benjamin, this threshold is a ‘constellation of awakening’, that is, a 
possibility for the solitary individual to seize the remnants of a collective dream-
image, which he also calls happiness.
  The genuine collector recollects nothing other than the 
transmissibility of the collective dream-image—happiness, justice, redemption—by 
citing it in the present.  The destructive, awakening element of collecting is the 
transmission of a charged, potentially citable, situation: a threshold between habit 
and attentiveness where ‘the irretrievability of the past’ takes place.  It is here that 
Benjamin relates the genuine collector (a solitary individual) and the masses, the 
collective.   
63
 
60 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 207. 
  This threshold between is nothing other 
than the ‘intermediate world’ Benjamin discerns in Kafka’s work: ‘a token of hope 
which comes to us from that intermediate world – at once unfinished and 
61 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 389; GS V:1, 491. 
62 Werner Hamacher, ‘Afformative Strike: Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”’ in Destruction & 
Experience: Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy, eds. Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, Manchester: 
Clinamen Press, 2000, 122. 
63 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 458.  Perhaps this is why he concludes his essay ‘Unpacking My 
Library: A Talk about Book Collecting’ by contemplating the ‘happiness [Glück] of the collector’.  
Scholem explains that for Benjamin happiness has ‘a wholly new meaning’ because it is ‘based on the 
conflict between the “once only” and the “yet again” … the unique, the “once only” [and] precisely not 
that which one has lived through … but rather the wholly new and as yet unlived’; see his “Walter 
Benjamin and His Angel” in On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections, ed. Gary Smith, 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991, 77.  This (im)possibility of happiness orients Benjamin’s work; it 
is the ground on which he erects the entirety of his materialist philosophy.  For him, to grasp the 
profane is the ‘quietest approach’ of redemption: the actualization of the as yet unlived, the 
potentiality of the what-has-been. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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commonplace’.64  The what-has-been survives in this intermediate world: survival 
requires judging the past, interrogating it, until it yields to the weight of the what-
has-been.  Survival is a historiographic task, a Sisyphean task, not to transmit the 
tradition of barbarism, but to judge and condemn ‘cultural history’ in favor of an 
historia abscondita.  As Benjamin makes clear: ‘cultural history lacks the destructive 
element which authenticates both dialectical thought … It may augment the weight 
of the treasure accumulating on the back of humanity, but it does not provide the 
strength to shake off this burden so as to gets its hands on them’.65
 
  Instead of an 
oppressive cultural history, Benjamin proposes a critical one able to cast off the 
dead weight of the past—Sisyphus’s rock—and actualize the present.  
IV. 
 
Arendt and Benjamin share a commitment to actualize the present, a project directly 
related to larger divergent ethical and political goals.  Surveying these goals 
requires an aesthetic figure of this virtual historiography: the histor, a virtuality that 
‘can never hope to be fully instantiated or exhausted in any one realization, [which] 
remains open to the future’.66  This aesthetic figure only exists between Arendt and 
Benjamin: recollected by Arendt, passing through Benjamin’s ‘genuine collector’.  
After Arendt’s humanism, before Benjamin’s materialism, there is the histor’s 
gesture—retrospective, judging, facing the thingness (Dinglichkeit) of representation 
(whether visual or linguistic) in order to remediate the impoverishment of 
experience.  This gesture has the characteristics of the ‘strike’—the striking effect of 
citation—because the ‘sphere in which this caesura intervenes would be that of 
aesthetic ideology in art and politics’.67  Thus, its ‘peculiar duality of wanting to 
preserve and wanting to destroy’, which, as Arendt herself noted, defines the 
‘ambiguity of gesture’.68  By deposing aesthetic ideology the histor does not simply 
re-write history, but gestures toward the expressionless (das Ausdruckslose) inscribed 
on the face of things.  To grasp the expressionless, this transmissible index, we must 
come to understand how it alters our reading of the past; how exhibition and 
gesture supplement narration, that is, how and why what-has-been shuttles 
between situations and events.  As Arendt and Benjamin contend, ‘we have been 
endowed’ with the ability to impart an-other history, an an-archic history.  Thus, the 
‘turn of recollection’ is always already a Fortleben, a living on, that is also a living 
away from, otherwise.69
 
64 Italics mine, Benjamin, Illuminations, 118. 
  After all, sisyphos in Greek signifies a ‘man of extremely 
keen taste’, that is, an exemplar that we must ‘forget ourselves’ if we are to judge the 
world, survive ourselves, and to recollect the future of the image. 
65 Italics mine, SW 3, 268.  This is my slightly emended translation of the original text; see GS II:2, 478. 
66 Weber, Benjamin’s –abilties, 14. 
67 Hamacher, ‘Afformative Strike’, 122. 
68 Arendt, ‘Introduction’, 41-2. 
69 This definition of Fortleben, distinct from Nachleben, is from Weber, Benjamin’s –abilities, 65. Jae Emerling                                      An art history of means: Arendt-Benjamin 
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